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The concept of information is becoming a central category in the sciences 
and in society at large. Apart from the rise of information technology, 
information is used to shed light on all sorts of phenomena, ranging from 
physics, biology, cognition and perception, epistemology, ontology, ethics 
to aesthetics: some even argue that the universe itself is an information-
processing device. The concept of information is thus changing the way 
we perceive and evaluate the world and ourselves. De Mul (1999) states 
that this results in an informatisation of the worldview, comparable to the 
mechanisation of the worldview in the seventeenth century. Yet, the sheer 
number of applications of the concept of information makes it a ‘polyse-
mantic concept’ (Floridi, 2013) and a ‘notoriously promiscuous term with 
a marked capacity for dulling critical capacities’ (Timpson, 2006: 221).
In this paper, I argue that the failure to distinguish between informa-
tion and data lies at the root of much confusion that surrounds the concept 
of information. Although data are ‘out there’, i.e. concrete, informational 
content is abstract and always co-constituted by information agents – a set 
which includes at least linguistically capable human beings. Information 
is thus not an intrinsic property of concrete data, but rather a relational 
property, which relies on the existence of information agents.
In part one, I take our ordinary, semantic, conception of language – as 
something that can inform us – as the explanandum of this paper. I there-
fore first delineate this concept from the technical notion of information 
as developed by Shannon. Thereafter, I introduce Floridi’s (2013) General 
Definition of Information, wherein information is construed as well-formed 
meaningful data. Elaborating on this distinction between information and 
data, I argue, pace Floridi, that human-generated information can only 
be meaningful relative to an information agent who knows how to inter-
pret the data, since the semantic value of the human-generated data is 
dependent on the horizon of experience of the information agent. The 
meaningfulness of data is therefore a relational property.
In part two, I broaden the scope and argue that besides human-gener-
ated information, environmental information also depends on information 
agents. Using Hutto and Myin’s (2013) Covariance Doesn’t Constitute 
Content Principle, I argue that it is not possible to speak of informational 
content ‘out there’ as existing independent of information agents. I argue 
that such a concept of informational content ‘out there’, could not be causally 
efficacious, thereby making a description in terms of content superfluous. 
In part three, I consider and reject two proposals that do take infor-
mation to be an objective commodity. The first is Dretske’s (1981), which 
I argue does not succeed in providing an information agent-independent 
concept of informational content. The second concerns foundational views 
of information, which make the ontological claim that information is the 
fundamental ingredient of reality (one can think for instance of Wheeler’s 
‘it from bit’, or certain positions in theoretical physics, such as Susskind’s 
idea of the holographic universe). I argue that these accounts trivialise the 
concept of information by conflating the notions of data and information.
1. What is ‘Information’? 
As noted in the introduction, ‘information’ as a concept is notoriously 
polysemantic, pertaining to very different applications. In this section I 
introduce Floridi’s (2005; 2013) data/information distinction, which allows 
us to get a grip on the slippery concept of information. Thereafter, I argue 
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that human-generated data do not have a semantics independent of an infor-
mation agent. But first of all, I explicate the difference between our ordinary 
conception of information and Shannon’s technical notion of information.
1.1 Two Concepts of Information
When we talk about information, there are different kinds of phenomena 
we might be interested in. In our everyday use, information has both a pas-
sive and an active connotation. First, we can think of it as something that 
is ‘out there’, a commodity or stuff that can be stored and transmitted. For 
instance, there is information contained on the hard disk of my computer, 
but this information cannot do anything by itself – it patiently awaits 
processing. In this sense, information is used as an abstract mass noun 
(Adriaans, 2012), i.e. it is uncountable and not individuated, like the con-
crete mass noun ‘water’. On the other hand, we also view information as 
having an informing relation to an information agent1. An agent thereby 
learns, or gets to know, something about the world through this informa-
tion (De Mul, 1999). Moreover, this implies that information is always 
about something else, it describes a state of affairs and is hence inten-
tional. In our everyday use of the concept of information, three features 
therefore seem crucial: ‘agents which represent and use the information, 
dynamic events of information change, and ‘aboutness’: the information 
is always about some relevant described situation or world’ (Adriaans & 
Van Benthem, 2008: 13). Viewed in this way, information has semantic 
or meaningful content, and allows us to come to know things about the 
world. Furthermore, it is a qualitative concept: it is about what we can 
come to know about the world, not how much.
Apart from this everyday use, there are rigorous mathematical defini-
tions of information that do quantify information. Although these employ 
the word ‘information’, this concept of information is distinct from our 
everyday use of it. The most prominent of these mathematical definitions2 
is the one formulated in the Mathematical Theory of Communication 
(MTC) (Shannon, 1948). Using this theory, we can calculate the amount 
of information contained in a message that is transmitted from a sender to 
a receiver over a communication channel, based on the probabilities that 
are associated with the different messages that could have been sent. The 
underlying idea is that messages which are less likely to be sent contain 
more information. Consider a unary information source, which is a source 
capable of sending only one message. Receiving this message is not inform-
ative as nothing can be learnt from it3. As the possibilities increase, the 
informativeness of the message also increases. This process can be thought 
of as a reduction of uncertainty: if I tell you the outcome of a coin toss, 
supposing the coin is fair, the two possibilities (heads or tails) are reduced 
to one, namely the one I tell you. But if I tell you about the random place-
ment of a marker on a chessboard, there is a much greater reduction of 
uncertainty: sixty-four possibilities get reduced to one4. 
It is important to realise that MTC does not specify what the content 
of a message is. It can only tell us about the quantity of information that is 
transmitted. As long as two possible outcomes are equally likely, just one bit 
of information is transmitted when we are told about the actual outcome, 
no matter what the content of this message is. MTC therefore deals with a 
technical meaning of information that is distinct from the ordinary mean-
ing of the word (Floridi, 2013: 33). One counter-intuitive result of this is 
that – given the probabilities of the occurrence of letter combinations in 
English – a page of random letters contains more information than a page 
of well-formed English sentences, as the probability of the former is lower 
than that of the latter. Hence, whereas in colloquial speech information is 
explicitly linked to epistemic notions based on informational content, this 
is not the case in the more technical notions of information. For the rest of 
this paper I use information in the broader, everyday sense of the word, as 
having semantic properties.
Although there is no standard view on how these two notions of 
information relate, there is widespread agreement that ‘MTC provides a 
rigorous constraint to any further theorising on all the semantic and prag-
matic aspects of information’ (Ibid.: 48). The strength of the constraint, 
however, is currently a matter of debate. Interpretations of this constrain-
ing relation differ from very strong, as for instance mechanical engineering 
is constrained by Newtonian physics, to very weak, somewhat as playing 
tennis is constrained by the same Newtonian physics (Ibid.). In the con-
clusion I briefly return to this constraining relation.
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1.2 Information and Data
As we have seen, the ordinary notion of information is epistemically 
related to information agents, who can use information to learn about 
their world. Information therefore has  semantic content: it is about 
something. But this tells us nothing about what information is and how 
it is manifested in the world around us. In this paper I follow the General 
Definition of Information (GDI) as expounded by Floridi (2005; 2013), 
according to which there cannot be information without data. In this 
section, I briefly introduce this GDI, and the accompanying definition 
of data.
The general idea behind the distinction between data and information 
is the formula data + meaning = information. Although this distinction 
is not universally accepted, ‘a conceptual analysis must start somewhere’ 
(Floridi, 2013: 3). The GDI is as follows (Ibid.: 7): 
ı is an instance of information, understood as semantic content, iff
1. ı consists of one or more data;
2. the data in ı are well-formed;
3. the well-formed data in ı are meaningful.5
The last condition implies that the data under consideration must comply 
with the semantics of a chosen system, code or language. This meaning, 
however, does not have to be linguistic, i.e. symbolical, as the referencing 
relation can also be determined causally or iconically (De Mul, 1999). The 
condition of well-formedness is syntactical of nature. This syntax also does 
not have to be linguistic, but must be understood in a broader sense, as 
what determines the form or structure of something. One can for instance 
think of the correct ordering of pixels when the informational content is 
a picture.
The first condition states that information consists of at least one 
datum. To explain what a datum is, Floridi (2013: 9) gives a Diaphoric 
(from the Greek diaphora, ‘difference’) Definition of Data (DDD): ‘A 
datum is a putative fact regarding some difference or lack of uniformity 
within some context’. This definition, which is very general in nature, can 
be applied at three levels: 
1. Data as diaphora de re: as lacks of uniformity in the world out 
there. As ‘fractures in the fabric of being’ (Floridi, 2013: 9) they 
cannot be directly known or experienced, but they can be empiri-
cally inferred from experience. They thus serve as an ontological 
requirement not unlike Kant’s noumena. 
2. Data as diaphora de signo: as lacks of uniformity between (the per-
ception of ) at least two physical states. 
3. Data as diaphora de dicto: as lacks of uniformity between two sym-
bols. 
Based on different assumptions, diaphora de re may be either identical 
with, or a precondition for diaphora de signo, which in turn form a pre-
requisite for diaphora de dicto. For instance, the text you are reading now 
is based on the diaphora de dicto between the letters of the alphabet (they 
have different shapes), which in turn is made possible by the perceivably 
different light-reflecting properties of the paper and the ink, which are 
diaphora de signo. 
From these two definitions (GDI and DDD) it is evident that infor-
mation must always be embodied as data, i.e. as lacks of (perceived) 
uniformity in some medium. Moreover, the DDD allows for a great 
diversity of classifications, logical types, and realizations of these differ-
ences. This means that Floridi’s framework is very general in nature, which 
makes it compatible with different frameworks. This generality is apparent 
because, according to Floridi (2013: 10), the DDD underdetermines:
t the classification of data (taxonomic neutrality);
t the logical type to which the data belong (typological neutrality);
t the physical implementation of data (ontological neutrality), and
t the dependence of the data’s semantics on a producer (genetic neu-
trality).
The fact that Floridi’s DDD is neutral with regard to these respects 
means that the analysis given in this paper does not hinge on any particular 
view of what could constitute data. In the next section, I briefly introduce 
the taxonomic and typological neutrality, in which I concur with Floridi. 
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A more elaborate discussion is needed for the ontological neutrality, as I 
have to introduce the type/token distinction between data and informa-
tion – which Floridi does not – in order to discuss the causal efficaciousness 
of information in the next part. In the last section of this part, I depart 
from Floridi’s framework, when I argue against his idea that data can have 
a semantics independently of any informee (genetic neutrality).
1.3 The Taxonomic and Typological Neutrality of Data
First of all, the DDD is taxonomically neutral. This is because the difference 
which constitutes the datum is an extrinsic, or relational, property. An 
example can demonstrate this: take a short burst of sound in a silent con-
text. This sound is only a datum in relation to the silence, which is not only 
a necessary condition for the burst of sound to be discernible as a datum, 
but is also constitutive for the [burst-of-sound-in-silence] datum. It is thus 
the difference between sound and silence that constitutes the datum, not 
merely the burst of sound itself. This implies that the silence could also be 
classified as a datum, for this is the other relatum in the [burst-of-sound-
in-silence] datum. In other words, nothing is a datum per se. This point 
is captured in the slogan ‘data are relata’ (Floridi, 2013: 11). A further 
example might clarify. In Morse code, long and short beeps constitute the 
data which allow telegraph operators to send messages. However, it would 
be possible to have a continuous tone with long and short interruptions to 
transmit messages in Morse code. In the latter case, it would be the silences 
that are the data. Similarly, there could be data that are not classified as 
such, as would be the case if the beeps that are used to transmit Morse code 
differ in volume. Although there would be additional data in the message 
(differences in volume of the beeps), we need not classify these as data.
Secondly, the typological neutrality states that information can consist 
of different types of data as relata (Floridi, 2013: 11). Most of the time, 
when we talk about data we mean primary data. These are the data that an 
artefact is designed to convey. We could for example think of the position 
of the hands of a clock informing us about the time. But the absence of 
data may also be informative, for instance when you ask a person if she is 
sleeping, and she does not answer. The fact that you do not get a response 
could still answer your question. Floridi coins these secondary data. Fur-
thermore, we can often infer a lot more from primary data than just what 
they are meant to convey. If I ask a person whether he knows the way to 
the park and he gives me an answer, I do not only learn the route to the 
park, but I also come to know that he speaks English. This is a form of 
derivative data, which are created accidentally when we try to convey pri-
mary data. Lastly, there is information that concerns other data. Meta-data 
are data about other data, informing us for instance of the type of data. 
Operational data are data regarding the operations of a data system. For 
example, when your computer tells you there is an error, this prevents you 
from taking the primary data it produces at face value.
1.4 Ontological Neutrality: Information as an Abstract Type
As we have seen, information relies on the existence of data. The ontologi-
cal neutrality states that the DDD is neutral with respect to the ontological 
realization of the data. This confirms our common-sense intuition that the 
same sentence, whether written on paper or encoded in binary and stored 
on a computer, contains the same information. Therefore, the medium, 
format and language do not influence the information contained in a mes-
sage. The differing realisations could of course convey different secondary 
or derivative data, but from the perspective of the primary data, the realisa-
tion does not matter.
The ontological neutrality thus further implies that there is a type/
token distinction between the information and the data it is realised in 
(Timpson, 2006). To explain how this works, we consider sending a mes-
sage in the vocabulary of MTC. In order to send a message, the sender has 
to select elements from a fixed alphabet, say {a1, a2, ..., an}, and transmit 
them over a communication channel. Now suppose we want to send the 
number ‘42’ to a receiver. We can do this using many different media: we 
could send him a piece of paper, an electronic message, or simply tell him 
the numbers directly. Now it is easy to see that the tokens would be very 
different in each case, ranging from scribbly lines (‘42’), to bits transmit-
ted as voltage differences along a copper wire, to complex vibrations in 
the air. 
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For those of us who speak English and are accustomed to using Arabic 
numerals to denote numbers, the three messages would convey the same 
type, i.e. the same informational content. The information that is repre-
sented by the type is therefore abstract. This implies that, being an abstract 
entity, the information itself has no spatio-temporal location, nor is it part 
of the material contents of the world. The tokens which realise these types, 
on the other hand, do have a spatiotemporal location. Prima facie, this 
seems like a denial of the objective existence of information, especially if 
you do not like abstracta in your ontology. But any talk of abstracta can 
easily be ‘paraphrased away as talk of obtaining facts about whether or not 
concrete types would or wouldn’t be instances of types’ (Timpson, 2006: 
228). This does not entail that information has no objective existence, 
or cannot be an objective commodity. But it does suggest that any talk 
of information, rather than of data, causing anything, has to be worded 
carefully. For different tokens (data), although they might realise the exact 
same type (information), might have very different effects in the world 
around us. Dretske (1989) gives us a clear example of this: consider a 
soprano, who sings a high note, thereby shattering a glass. If the token 
would be altered only slightly, for instance by singing a semitone lower, 
the glass would not have broken, whereas the informational content (the 
meaning of the words that the soprano is singing) would be identical. It is 
therefore, from the viewpoint of information, a contingent property of the 
token that causes the glass to break. However, when we are asking what 
the soprano is singing about, we are not interested in these contingent 
properties, but in the semantic content of the sounds she is producing. 
In this case, what we are asking for is the type, not the token. When I ask 
someone the question: ‘What number is written on this piece of paper?’, I 
want to be informed about the type, that is the number, that is realised by 
this particular token. We can think of this kind of ostensive acts as deferred 
ostension (Quine, 1969).
Prima facie, this implies that in order for the informational content 
to be causally efficacious, there has to be an information agent that, in 
one way or another, recognises the type, rather than the token. Before I 
analyse how this view on informational content relates to information 
‘out there’ in the following part, I first argue that the type/token distinc-
tion between informational content and the data by which this content 
is realised implies that the informational content cannot be thought 
to exist independently of an information agent who co-constitutes this 
content.
1.5 Against Genetic Neutrality: the Meaninglessness of Data in the 
Absence of Information Agents
Genetic neutrality is the idea that ‘data (as relata) can have a semantics 
independently of any informee’ (Floridi, 2013: 17). This is not meant to 
be a thesis about how data can acquire a meaning in a semiotic system, 
but rather about how data can be thought of as meaningful independent 
of an informee. The example that Floridi (2013: 18) gives are Egyptian 
hieroglyphs, that, before the discovery of the Rosetta Stone, were incom-
prehensible. Even though there was a time when we did not know what 
their meaning was, there was a meaning hidden in these symbols – if we are 
to take Floridi’s thesis at face value. This example deserves further analysis, 
especially considering the important role that information agents play, as 
we have seen in the last section.
The first observation that is relevant here is that when we study ancient 
texts, ‘we do not “see” the meaning as a feint [sic] aura around the char-
acters’ (Hansen, 1985: 492). It is not the case that Egyptian hieroglyphs 
contain an objective meaning hidden within them, which can be made 
visible by acquiring the ability to interpret hieroglyphs. For ‘the seman-
tic value of information is dependent on the horizon of experience – or 
speaking hermeneutically – the world of the user’ (De Mul, 1999: 81). In 
trying to understand the meaning of the hieroglyphs, we are not engaged 
in a theoretical reconstruction, for this is an illusion which can only be a 
regulative idea or a methodological idealisation (De Mul, 1993: 13). This 
implies that meaning cannot be an objective property of data as relata. 
Although the information contained in the data might prima facie seem to 
be well-formed and meaningful, this does not imply that they are actually 
meaningful. An example might illustrate this point.
The Voynich Manuscript, a book carbon dated to the early fifteenth 
century, is written entirely in an as of yet undeciphered script. Although the 
script shares many informational characteristics with European languages 
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(it has for instance about 20-30 characters and a word entropy6 of 10 bits 
(Landini, 2001)), its resistance against deciphering makes the attribution 
of a semantics speculative. It remains unclear whether a ‘Rosetta Stone’ 
will, or even could, ever be found for this manuscript. So we are now in 
the same position with regard to the Voynich Manuscript that we were in 
with regard to Egyptian hieroglyphs before the discovery of the Rosetta 
Stone. Both texts surely seemed to be meaningful to us, but whether they 
actually do possess a semantics was unknown – and remains unknown 
for the Voynich Manuscript. We can thus only say that the script carries 
meaning, when we are able to decipher it. In other words, if the Rosetta 
Stone did not exist (assuming for now that there would be no other way 
of deciphering hieroglyphs), the meaning of the hieroglyphs would have 
been lost forever. 
But examples of this can also be found closer to home. Think for 
instance of the data that are on your hard disk. These data are encoded 
in a very particular way, based on convention. For instance, text can 
be encoded in ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Inter-
change) format. In this format, the letter ‘A’ is represented by the binary 
code ‘1000001’, whereas the ‘a’ is encoded as ‘1100001’. It should be clear 
that in the absence of the ASCII decoding manual, the strings of ones and 
zeros would be unintelligible to most English speakers. So if there were 
no way of decoding them, the strings of ones and zeros would contain no 
information. Consider for instance that a person comes up with his own 
version of ASCII code, randomly switching around the encodings for the 
different letters. If he were to leave us a short message which we only found 
after his death, the data would be meaningless to us. And since they were 
only meaningful to one person, who no longer exists, it seems unclear 
what it would mean to claim that the information is still in there. The 
information is lost forever, independent of the fact whether the message 
was intended to carry information or not.
These examples, however, do not show that certain data cannot seem 
to be meaningful to us before we can attribute meaning to it. The reason 
why a lot of people try to decipher the Voynich Manuscript, and before 
that, hieroglyphs, is that they seem to be meaningful. However, a dis-
tinction has to be made between merely seeming to be meaningful and 
actually being meaningful. A wonderful example of this can be found in 
the Codex Seraphinianus (Serafini, 1981), an illustrated encyclopedia of an 
imaginary, surreal world. Like the Voynich Manuscript, it is written in a 
strange script, and similarly, attracted a lot of attention from people, who 
tried to decipher it. However, in 2009 Serafini announced that the script 
was asemic (Stanley, 2010), so we can know for sure that the script does 
not carry meaning. Although it seems unlikely, the same could have been 
true for the Egyptian hieroglyphs. The hieroglyphs could have turned out 
to be asemic, i.e. have no semantic content – they could have been merely 
decorative, carrying no information. From this we can conclude that seem-
ing to be meaningful does not imply meaningfulness, although of course it 
could warrant us to try to decipher a text.
The idea expressed in the two examples given is that having-a-seman-
tics, just as being-a-datum, is a relational property. It is therefore unclear 
what the genetic neutrality is meant to express, as we would be unable 
to verify its correctness: either we can interpret the text, in which case 
the semantics is not independent of an informee but depends equally on 
the interpreted and (the horizon of experience of ) the interpreter, or we 
cannot interpret the text, in which case we cannot know whether the data 
under consideration could have a semantics. Moreover, in the former case 
the actual semantics that is attributed to the data in question is constitu-
tively dependent on the information agent. An illuminating example of 
this is given by De Mul (1999: 81): ‘A symptom that provides the doc-
tor with valuable information for the determination of a diagnosis can 
be meaningless, or have a very different meaning, to the patient’. De Mul 
concludes from this remark that ‘the same information [better: data] can 
give rise to different forms of knowledge and action’ (Ibid.). Here the dis-
tinction between informational content and data can help us make sense 
of this: although both the doctor and the patient have access to the same 
data (the symptom), the informational content it provides them with is 
surely different. It is true that the data provide the doctor with valua-
ble information, but his medical background knowledge in this case is 
constitutive for the information. If we give up on the intrinsic meaningful-
ness of data as relata, we can see that the data are not meaningful for the 
patient, whereas they are meaningful for the doctor. As meaningfulness is 
the third condition for information in the GDI, the symptom thus has 
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informational content for the doctor, that it does not have for the patient. 
This is consistent with saying that although the doctor is informed by the 
symptom about the patient’s particular ailment, the very same symptom 
does not inform the patient about his ailment. I would therefore like to 
modify the definition of genetic neutrality in order to incorporate this 
necessary relation: data (as relata) can seem to have a semantics independ-
ently of any informee; but the informational content is always constituted 
in the relation between the data and an information agent. 
2. The Agent-Dependency of Information Content Out There
In the first part I have considered human-generated information, and 
argued that informational content in those cases is dependent on informa-
tion agents. In this part, I argue that the same applies to environmental 
data. Although cognition is often thought of as essentially information-
processing, this view has recently come under attack by a new paradigm in 
the cognitive sciences. Enactivism, as introduced in by Varela, Rosch and 
Thompson (1991), is opposed to the cognitivist idea of the information-
processing brain as being sufficient for cognition. In the introduction to 
the edited volume called Enaction – Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive 
Science, which aims to collect these new lines of thought and show how 
they deal with numerous aspects of cognition, John Stewart (2010: vii) 
states that ‘[t]his program makes a radical break with the formalisms of 
information-processing and symbolic representations prevalent in cogni-
tive science.’
In their Radicalizing Enactivism Hutto and Myin (2013) claim that 
this enactivist paradigm should be radicalised by denying that informa-
tional content can be an explanatory concept in studying basic cognition, 
which includes, inter alia, perceptual processes and their intentionality and 
phenomenality, and emotional responding. Starting from the idea that ‘the 
vast sea of what humans do and experience is best understood by appealing 
to dynamically unfolding, situated embodied interactions and engage-
ments with worldly offerings’ (Hutto & Myin, 2013:ix), they develop an 
account of basic cognition which has no need for mental content, where 
they define content as truth-bearing properties or specified conditions of 
satisfaction. Moreover, they claim that any theorist who does claim that 
cognition necessarily involves content must face up to the Hard Problem 
of Content, which is to explain the existence of content in a naturalistically 
respectable way. For if there is no informational content in nature, then 
‘cognitive systems don’t literally traffic in informational content’7 (Ibid.: 
xv). If anything, cognition can be thought of as content-creating rather 
than content-consuming (Ibid.: 76).
2.1 Covariance and Content
Hutto and Myin (2013) start from the assumption that information as 
covariance is the only scientifically respectable notion of information. Flor-
idi (2013) seems to agree when he talks about environmental information, 
although he already relates the information to an information agent. He 
states that environmental information can be defined as follows: ‘[t]wo 
systems a and b are coupled in such a way that a’s being (of type, or in 
state) F is correlated to b being (of type, or in state) G, thus carrying for the 
information agent the information that b is G’ (Floridi, 2013: 19, emphasis 
added). But if we want to have an account of informational content that 
can get basic cognition up and running, the content has to exist independ-
ently of anyone using the content. The informational content has to be 
able to be ‘retrieved, picked up, fused, bounded up, integrated, brought 
together, stored, used for later processing, and so on and so forth’ (Hutto 
& Myin, 2013). This problem of defining content naturalistically is what 
Hutto and Myin call the Hard Problem of Content.
For content has to have special properties to be properly called content. 
It has to have truth-bearing properties. In order to have these properties, 
content has to ‘say’ or ‘convey’ something about something else. Take a 
simple example: the number of tree rings can covary with the age of the 
tree, but by themselves the tree rings do not say or convey anything about 
the age of the tree, i.e., we can not meaningfully say that the tree rings 
are ‘false’, if for one reason or another they do not covary with the age of 
the tree. This is the Covariance Doesn’t Constitute Content Principle, which 
implies the Hard Problem of Content: if covariance does not constitute 
content, we need a more elaborate story that explains how cognition can 
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come to be contentful. Hutto and Myin use a slightly different terminol-
ogy to separate (informational) content from the processes underlying it 
than I have used so far8. Instead of making a distinction between data and 
information, they make a distinction between a vehicle and its content. 
They argue that, if we accept the Covariance Doesn’t Constitute Content 
Principle, the vehicle/content distinction falls apart at this level, which 
means we would be left with just the vehicle (Hutto & Myin, 2013: 68). 
Or, if we use the data/information distinction, we would be left with just 
the data, as there would be no informational content. In the next Section, I 
argue that, even if we did allow covariance to constitute content, a descrip-
tion in terms of information would not further our explanation of causal 
processes in the absence of information agents.
2.2 The Causal Efficaciousness of Informational Content in the 
Absence of Information Agents
A first stab at thinking about the causality of informational content – 
and its relation to covariance – thus conceived can be formulated by 
using a very simple example: a thermostat. For simplicity, let us assume 
that there are only two possible states in the environment, either too 
cold (Ec), or warm enough (Ew). The bimetal in the thermostat can then 
be either in a bent state (Bb) when it is too cold, or in a straight state 
(Bs) when it is warm enough. If the bimetal is bent, it will close a cir-
cuit, thereby turning on the heater (Hon), whereas if the bimetal is not 
bent, the circuit will be open, thereby turning off the heater (Hoff). Sup-
pose we further allow – for now – that because of the lawful covariance 
between the bending of the bimetal and the ambient temperature, the 
bimetal contains information about the temperature, and thus that cov-
ariance does constitute content. Whether or not the bimetal is bent will 
serve here as the datum de signo, realizing the information. Call this 
information either IB(c) or IB(w), where the subscript serves to designate 
the datum (either Bb or Bs) under consideration, and the value between 
brackets specifies the ambient temperature. The status of the heater can 
be said to covary in the same manner with the temperature in the room, 
realizing the information IH(c) and IH(w).
For reasons of simplicity, we have limited the number of states the 
total system can be in to two discrete states9. Now the two states of the sys-
tem can be schematically visualised, with the horizontal arrows indicating 
causal relations, and the vertical arrows indicating the realising relation:
Information (abstract)  IB(c)   IH(c)
āāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāĹāāāāĹ · · 
Data (concrete)          Ec   ĺ    Bb   ĺ   Hon
Diagram 1: too cold
Information (abstract)  IB(w)   IH(w)
āāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāĹāāāāĹ · · 
Data (concrete)          Ew   ĺ    Bs   ĺ   Hoff
Diagram 2: warm enough
From these diagrams, we can easily see that once the causal story has been 
told, the informational states that are assumed to be realised by the bimetal 
and the status of the heater – based on the covariance relation that obtains 
between them and the environment – are superfluous10. In other words, 
once the causal story at the level of the concrete data has been told, there is 
nothing left to explain11. The concept of information is simply not needed 
to explain the workings of the thermostat. 
This analysis is further corroborated when we analyse a possible way in 
which the workings of the thermostat might be interrupted: suppose that 
some properties of the metals of which the bimetal is composed changed, 
thereby transforming its bending behaviour. This might lead to a situ-
ation in which the bimetal does not close the circuit when the ambient 
temperature is too cold, whilst it might – based on the idea that covariance 
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does constitute informational content – still contain information about 
the temperature because the bending of the bimetal still covaries with the 
ambient temperature. It is therefore not the information-carrying role that 
allows the intended working of the thermostat, but the – from the view-
point of the information – contingent physical properties of the token that 
realises that information. This implies that even if we were to allow that 
covariance does constitute content, the alleged content would be causally 
superfluous. In other words, covariance by itself suffices to explain the 
workings of the thermostat.
We can thus conclude that the assumption of causal efficaciousness of 
information in inanimate systems is problematic because of the abstract 
nature of information. In the absence of information agents, it seems not 
to be the information, i.e. the abstract type, but rather the data, or con-
crete tokens which realise the information, that are causally active. It is 
only in the case when an information agent recognises a particular token to 
be a token of a particular type, that the informational content comes into 
existence and can become causally active. As we have seen, when a human 
being would point to a piece of bent bimetal, given enough background 
knowledge, she would point at the type through an act of deferred osten-
sion (‘look how warm it is’). The crucial phrase in the last sentence is ‘given 
enough background knowledge’. The bimetal-as-datum only contains the 
information that it is either too cold or warm enough in relation to an 
information agent that already knows about the covariance relation that 
obtains between the bimetal and the ambient temperature.
3. Possible Defences of Agent-Independent Informational 
Content
The above analysis leaves the defenders of content with three possi-
ble responses to the Hard Problem of Content. First, they might posit 
informational content as an extra element of reality, not unlike how 
Chalmers (e.g. 1995) tries to solve the problem of phenomenal experi-
ence in a functionalist philosophy of mind by positing the existence of 
qualia. This, however, changes the way we look at information radically, 
leaving naturalistic accounts the task of finding fundamental bridging 
laws between covariance relations in the world and informational content 
(Hutto & Myin, 2013: 69). Moreover, this move leaves defenders of infor-
mational content with additional problems to solve. If the informational 
content is indeed an extra element of reality this introduces (1) epistemic 
problems: how do we get to know these informational contents if they 
are ontologically distinct from the causal processes which affect us; and 
(2) overdetermination problems: if we were to think of the informational 
contents as extra elements of reality, we would have secured their objective 
existence, but then we would still need to explain how they can be causally 
efficacious, as we have seen in the last section. Although this manoeuvre 
might be the only way to solve the Hard Problem of Content (Ibid.), it is 
most certainly not a panacea, and the metaphysical costs will be too high.
Second, the notion of informational content might be thought of as 
meatier than covariance, whilst retaining naturalistic respectability. The 
most prominent proposal along these lines is given by Dretske (1981), 
who thinks of informational content as having an indicating relation to 
some state of affairs, thereby realizing truth-bearing properties – that is, 
content – in an objective world. In the next section I take a closer look at 
Dretske’s account, arguing that it does not succeed in defending this objec-
tive, information-agent independent, existence of informational content. 
Third, the distinction between information and data (or vehicles and 
content) might be denied, thereby reducing the concept of information 
to the concept of data. In the last section of this part, I argue that this 
trivialises the concept of information, thereby adding to the confusion that 
surrounds the concept of information.
3.1 Dretske on Information as an Objective Commodity
‘In the beginning there was information. The word came later.’ (Dretske, 
1981: vii). These opening lines of Dretske’s book on information clearly 
show his ambition. Information is to be thought of as an objective com-
modity, whose existence pre-dates, and is independent of, the existence 
of information agents. This ambition is further developed in the second 
paragraph of the book, where Dretske explicitly opposes the view that 
‘something only becomes information when it is assigned some significance, 
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interpreted as a sign, by some cognitive agent’ (Ibid.), a variant of which 
I am defending in this paper. But prima facie, this ambition is not vis-
ible in his definition of information, as the background knowledge of the 
information agent (denoted by the variable k) is explicitly mentioned in it: 
‘Informational content: A signal r carries the information that s is F = [sic] 
The conditional probability of s’s being F, given r (and k), is 1 (but, given k 
alone, less than 1)’ (Dretske, 1981: 65). That this background knowledge 
is constitutive of the informational content that a signal carries is further 
underlined in one of the examples that Dretske uses. 
Dretske asks us to suppose that there are four shells, with a peanut 
located under one of them (Dretske, 1981: 78). Suppose further that per-
son a knows that the peanut is not under either shell 1 or 2, whilst person 
b has no knowledge of the location of the peanut at all. If both person a 
and b now get the information that the peanut is not under shell 3, this 
observation of course allows person a to work out that the peanut is under 
shell 4, whereas person b is still unaware of the location of the peanut. 
After considering both the option that for person a the observation only 
carries the information that the peanut is not under shell 3, and the option 
that this observation additionally also carries the information for person 
a that the peanut is under shell 4, Dretske decides on the latter: ‘the third 
observation supplies [person a] with the information that shell 3 is empty 
and the information that the peanut is under shell 4. The latter piece of 
information is (for [person a]) nested in the former piece of information. 
For [person b] it is not’ (Dretske, 1981: 79). So the informational content 
contained in the same signal differs depending on the background knowl-
edge of the person who receives that signal. 
This seems to be in direct opposition to the idea that information is 
out there. Dretske’s solution, which allows him to hold both that infor-
mation is out there and that the informational content of a signal is 
dependent on the background knowledge of the information agent, is the 
recursive character of his definition. The background knowledge can be 
explained itself in terms of information received earlier, until ‘eventually 
we reach the point where the information received does not depend on 
any prior knowledge’ (Dretske, 1981: 87). At first sight, however, it is not 
obvious that all knowledge can be recursively based on these foundational 
cases (Alston, 1983). Moreover, Dretske does not provide a way in which 
the probability of these foundational cases of information extraction from 
the environment could be one, as is required by his own definition (Levi, 
1983). So unless Dretske’s account is supplemented with a valid descrip-
tion of how we, as tabulae rasae, might – based solely on a signal r – know 
that the conditional probability of s being F is 1, the informational content 
Dretske is talking about is always relative to the background knowledge of 
an information agent. In other words, an information agent has to know 
the probabilities attached to the possible signals that a source could send 
before she can know the informational content that a particular signal car-
ries (Moor, 1982: 238). Moreover, even if this problem were to be solved, 
this would only prove the objective existence of these foundational cases 
of information. The majority of the informational content ‘picked up’ 
from the environment would still be co-constituted by the background 
knowledge. Barwise (1983: 65) acknowledges this point when he states 
that although ‘information is out there, it informs only those attuned to 
the relations that allow its flow’. In the terminology of Dretske, we could 
translate this by saying that although the signals are out there, the infor-
mational content they carry is always relative to an information agent. 
And this just amounts to saying that data are out there, but information is 
always relative to an information agent.
3.2 Foundational Accounts of Information
We can use Shannon’s Mathematical Theory of Communication (MTC) 
to calculate the average amount of information that a system transmits12. 
This measure is also called the entropy of the information source (Adriaans, 
2012: 15). Entropy is a measure that, prior to the rise of MTC, was 
already widely used in thermodynamics, of which the second law states 
that the entropy of isolated systems can never decrease, because isolated 
systems evolve to a state of maximal entropy. Entropy is therefore often 
associated with disorder, although randomness would be a better term as 
it is a syntactical, not a semantic notion (Floridi, 2013: 37). The concept 
of entropy therefore connects thermodynamics to information theory. In 
the words of Adriaans and Van Benthem (2008: 8): ‘information the-
ory is the thermodynamics of code strings, while thermodynamics is the 
Jasper van den Herik | Is Information Out There?
30
Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy
information theory of particles in space’. Because in quantum mechanics, 
information turns out to be discrete instead of continuous, any physical 
system could in principle be described by a finite amount of information. 
This analogy can be taken to the extreme, in the claim that the universe 
is ultimately a computational system, with information being the most 
basic ingredient. 
According to theoretical physicist Susskind, for instance, the idea that 
information never disappears is the most fundamental principle of physics 
(Susskind & Lindesay, 2005). The concept of information he is referring 
to here is that of fundamental distinctions between things: ‘Information 
means distinctions between things. A hydrogen atom is not an oxygen 
atom, an oxygen atom is not a hydrogen atom’ (World Science Festival, 
2011[13:30]). Physicist and mathematician Brian Greene states: ‘Every 
object in some sense contains information, because it contains a very spe-
cific arrangement of particles’ (World Science Festival, 2011[9:20]). From 
this kind of observations, one might conclude that information is the most 
basic ingredient of reality, and that space and time, matter and energy, 
are merely derivative notions13. Wheeler (1990) coined this idea ‘it from 
bit’ (see also Schmidhuber (1997) and Lloyd & Ng (2004) for similar 
accounts). I shall refer to accounts like these as foundational accounts of 
information.
Prima facie, if we take these accounts seriously, it seems that informa-
tion is out there after all. But on second thought, this view on information 
is more akin to Floridi’s DDD. It just states that the world ultimately con-
sists of lacks of uniformity ‘out there’, the diaphora de re mentioned earlier. 
Floridi (2013: 16) can therefore state that the GDI is neutral with regard 
to these foundational accounts of information. What is important to real-
ise here, is that these accounts do not give us any hints on how one state 
of affairs could carry information about another state of affairs. Strictly 
speaking, things would only carry information about themselves. Taking 
information to be fundamental in this way thus reduces the concept of 
‘information’ to that of ‘data’. Foundational accounts of information thus 
trivialise the concept of information. Quite literally everything becomes 
information if we regard information as diaphora de re. It should hardly 
come as a surprise that the world is full of differences. Everything, from a 
rock rolling down a hill, to a lone atom traversing the interstellar void, to 
the universe itself, becomes an information processing entity. Moreover, 
this conception of information actually negates the common-sense idea 
that information could be realised in different ways, for if two situations 
differ, so will their informational content. It would therefore no longer be 
possible to say that two different tokens of the same type would contain 
the same information. 
Finally, on closer inspection, foundational accounts of information 
turn out to be irrelevant to the question asked in this paper, that is, what 
semantic information is. For the diaphora de re that these accounts take 
to be the fundamental ingredient of reality are not directly perceivable by 
information agents, whilst the data to which they do attribute semantic 
properties can only be the diaphora de signo, which are perceivable. And 
whether these diaphora de signo ultimately consist of diaphora de re, par-
ticles or fields of energy is simply irrelevant to the question of how we 
can attribute meaning to them. Even if we were to accept the view that 
information is foundational in this sense, we would need a new concept to 
differentiate our ability of information processing from any other physical 
process. It therefore seems better to take these foundational accounts of 
information to be talking about data as being fundamental, reserving the 
concept of information for the role specified in this paper.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, I argued that in the beginning there were data and informa-
tion came later. This distinction between data and information can be 
helpful to differentiate between two concepts that are fundamentally dif-
ferent, but are now often conflated. Because the analysis of information 
given in this paper relies on Floridi’s General Definition of Information and 
the accompanying Diaphoric Definition of Data – which is taxonomically, 
typologically and ontologically neutral – it is consistent with a large variety 
of theories about what these data could be. In relying on the formula data 
+ meaning = information, the analysis in this paper therefore gives a general 
framework that could be adapted and worked out, for instance based on 
one’s ontological views.
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Much of the confusion that surrounds the concept of information can 
be traced, I think, to the fact that the use of the word ‘information’ carries 
connotations from our everyday, semantic use of the word to applications 
where these semantic properties do not exist. If the aim of a certain theory 
or field is not to talk about the semantic properties of data, the usage 
of ‘information’ can almost certainly be replaced with ‘data’. Because the 
concept of data does not carry these semantic connotations, this would 
clear some of the confusion. If we think back to Shannon’s Mathematical 
Theory of Communication, for instance, it seems that it would not lose 
any explanatory power if we take it to be about the communication of 
data, rather than of information. Rather than being about information per 
se, the MTC only weakly constrains theories about information because, 
as we have seen, information is always necessarily embodied as data. 
Realizing that although data are out there, informational content is 
always co-constituted by information agents, therefore allows us to see 
that information cannot be the fundamental ingredient of reality, as it is 
a relational property that exists between the data (which might turn out 
to be foundational) and the informational agent. Only when data become 
meaningful for an agent – when they come to have informational content 
by acquiring conditions of satisfaction – can an explanation in terms of 
information add anything to a causal explanation. For only the abstract 
informational content can explain how an information agent might react 
similarly to different tokens which consist of concrete data, which could 
have very different physical properties.
If we were to reserve the word ‘information’ for informational content 
in this sense, and use the word ‘data’ when we mean differences that are 
‘out there’, at least some of the confusion that surrounds the polysemantic 
concept of ‘information’ would dissolve.
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Notes
1. Because of the distinction between data and information, it is not the case that any agent 
is necessarily also an information agent. For instance, simple organisms can be sensitive to 
and act upon data from their environment, whilst not relying on informational content for 
their agency (as is apparent from Hutto & Myin’s (2013) Hard Problem of Content which 
is discussed in section 2). If we follow Hutto and Myin (2013) this label is only reserved for 
creatures who have an enculturated, scaffolded mind, i.e. who have linguistic capabilities. 
Others might attribute these content-generating capabilities to much lower forms of cogni-
tion, as in for instance the teleosemantics of Millikan (1984). For this paper I assume that 
at least linguistically capable human beings are information agents. The question whether 
other agents can also be information agents will have to be answered, but falls outside the 
scope of this paper.
2. Apart from Shannon-information, there are also other mathematical definitions that 
quantify information, like Kolmogorov complexity, Fisher information and Quantum 
information (Adriaans, 2012). As Shannon-information is the most widely used concep-
tion in philosophy, and it focusses on information transfer, I will only discuss this particular 
technical notion in this paper.
3. It has to be noted that MTC presupposes that the possible messages and the associated 
probabilities are known in advance.
4. Shannon gives the amount of information contained in a single message, for reasons that 
I will not go in here, as the negative log2 of the probability of that message occuring. This 
implies that a fair coin toss generates one bit of information, while the random placement 
of a marker on a chessboard generates six bits of information. The bits can be thought of as 
the amount of yes/no questions that have to be answered before the answer is reached. In 
the case of the coin this is one question (‘is it heads?’), whereas the position of the marker 
on the chessboard can be determined with six yes/no questions.
5. Floridi (2005) argues that a fourth condition has to be added, according to which the 
well-formed, meaningful data have to be truthful. In this paper I will try to steer clear of 
issues concerning truth(fulness), so I will not include it in the definition. The argument in 
this paper would, I think, not change depending on whether or not truthfulness is a neces-
sary condition for information.
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6. The word entropy specifies the amount of information given by the occurrence of that 
word, based on the probability of the word occurring.
7. Althought I am sympathetic to their project, in this chapter I merely wish to argue that 
the existence of informational content is dependent on users of this content, that is, infor-
mational content only arises when cognitive processes are in play. The stronger claim, that 
basic cognition could be explained without any appeal to content, lies outside the scope of 
this paper. Some commentators think that Hutto and Myin are not radical enough, because 
they take linguistic cognition – or in their terms ‘enculturated, scaffolded minds’ (Hutto & 
Myin, 2013: vii) – to be contentful, without telling a convincing story of how this content 
arises from the basic cognitive processes that on which the linguistic mind is built atop. See 
for instance Roberts (2013) for this critique.
8. The distinction between data and information could however, I believe, strengthen the 
account of Hutto and Myin. After they have concluded that basic cognition is not con-
tentful, they state that ‘[we] can still endorse the idea that organisms are informationally 
sensitive (i.e., that they exploit correspondences in their environments to adaptively guide 
their actions) while denying that it follows that they take in, store, or process informational 
content’ (Hutto & Myin, 2013: 82). If they were to accept the information/data distinc-
tion, we would see that organisms would not be informationally sensitive, but rather be 
sensitive to data. They would thereby be able to fend off attacks on their position, which 
could state that this still implies that this informational sensitivity implies information-
processing in a weaker sense.
9. Extending the example to more or continuous states does not change the conclusion 
reached here, but would needlessly complicate matters.
10. This argument is inspired by the objection based on causal closure and overdetermi-
nation that Jaegwon-Kim (1998) gives against non-reductive physicalist accounts of the 
mental.
11. At this point, it might be protested that the bimetal only carries the information about 
the temperature in virtue of being bent. Dretske puts forward a proposal along these lines: 
‘When, therefore, a signal carries the information that s is F in virtue of having property F’ 
[that the room is too cold in virtue of being bent], when it is the signal’s being F’ that car-
ries the information, then (and only then) will we say that the information that s is F causes 
whatever the signal’s being F’ causes’ (Dretske, 1981: 87). However, this does not yet show 
that it is the information that is causally efficacious. In the words of Rundle (1983: 78): 
‘rather, it amounts to a proposal to speak as if the information has this role when its carrier 
does. However, since the latter does give us a genuine cause. there is no way of pressing the 
objection that confronts the usual causal theories’.
12. The formula for calculating this for a system of possible messages A is 
H(P) = - ∑(iאA) pi log2 pi. This means that we take the average of the information contained 
in all messages that are a member of communication system A, i.e. the possible message 
that could be sent, by summing the amount of information contained in each message (log2 
pi), correcting for the chance of them occuring.
13. Timpson (2006) reminds us that the fact that a process in reality is accurately describa-
ble in terms of the information it contains, does not necessitate us to view this information 
as foundational. There might still be some material substrate that realises these fundamen-
tal differences. Both interpretations produce the same outcomes in experimental settings.
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